SHRINCS uses SHA-256 for post-quantum Bitcoin signatures, but wallet software must protect one-time keys while managing larger signature sizes.

Bitcoin’s post-quantum trade-off
A promising route to post-quantum signatures for Bitcoin comes with a hard engineering condition: wallet software must prevent users from mishandling one-time signing keys. Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and researcher Mikhail Kudinov have published a security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed signature scheme built around SHA-256, the hash function Bitcoin already uses. The team is seeking feedback on a draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal from engineers, cryptographers and protocol developers. Kudinov’s announcement links to the analysis.
The attraction is clear: a design based on a hash function already familiar to Bitcoin could offer a path toward signatures intended to withstand quantum attacks. But familiarity with SHA-256 doesn’t remove the implementation challenge. The proposal combines two signing methods with different operational risks, so its security depends on how software manages the transition between them.
SHRINCS pairs two ways to sign transactions. Its smaller, stateful signatures are more efficient, but depend on one-time keys that must never be reused. If a key’s state is mishandled, an attacker could forge a signature and steal funds. Stateless signatures reduce that implementation risk, but take up more space.
Wallets carry the burden
Nick’s view is blunt: users must not be able to trigger a catastrophic failure through ordinary mistakes. In a recent appearance on MARA Foundation TV, he said wallet developers need to manage the stateful component correctly. The specification and wallets, he argues, should automatically switch to the stateless path whenever the state counter might have been compromised.
That fallback is more than a convenience. Stateful signing systems rely on keeping track of which one-time keys have already been used; if software loses or corrupts that record, it may no longer know whether a key is safe to use. Asking people to notice and repair such a problem themselves would put too much weight on an operational detail that most wallet users can’t inspect. Automatic switching could limit that exposure, though it would also make the larger signature path a practical part of the design.
Here’s the thing: the compact option is still large by Bitcoin standards. Typical ECDSA signatures are 71 bytes, while Taproot Schnorr signatures are 64 bytes. SHRINCS stateful signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes; stateless signatures are 5,777 bytes. Nick says AI-based research is helping improve both paths, but the network cost remains uncertain.
Those comparisons don’t settle the question of whether SHRINCS is practical. They do show why a fallback policy matters: even the stateful signatures can be considerably larger than the signature formats Bitcoin uses today, and the stateless version is larger still. The actual effect would depend on how often each path is used and how transactions are constructed. The available figures describe signature sizes, not a complete forecast of fees or block usage.
Some users may choose stateless signing for peace of mind. If that becomes common, larger transactions could mean higher fees and fewer transactions fitting in each block. “We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” Nick said, warning that the change could affect Bitcoin’s value proposition.
That’s the central tension: SHRINCS aims to anchor security in SHA-256, a primitive already used by Bitcoin, while asking wallet developers to get key state exactly right. The proposal’s promise depends as much on safe implementation and signature size as on its cryptography.
The cryptography is only half the test
SHRINCS now faces a test that math alone can’t settle: whether Bitcoin’s stakeholders will accept the proposal’s trade-offs. The working group is still refining its specification, with researchers backed by nonprofits including Brink and OpenSats involved. That work matters, but adoption will depend on how the wider network responds over the coming months.
A security analysis can identify weaknesses in a design, while implementation work can reveal how the rules behave in wallet software. Neither answers the broader question of whether developers and users will accept the cost of larger signatures in return for a different security model. This is more significant than it looks: post-quantum readiness is not just a cryptographic property if safe operation depends on careful state management across wallets.
Blockstream researchers are asking the community to review both the proposal and its security analysis. That scrutiny should help clarify the design’s strengths and costs. It won’t, by itself, guarantee consensus. The cryptographic foundation has to hold up, and Bitcoin’s stakeholders have to decide the trade-offs are worth making.
What adoption would mean
If you’re working in this space, the practical question is whether wallet software can make the safe path the ordinary path, even when its internal key state becomes uncertain. A proposal can specify the fallback, but the user experience and implementation details will determine whether that protection works reliably in practice. And yet, adding a fallback doesn’t erase the bandwidth cost when it’s used.
Bitcoin’s debate, then, has two linked parts: confidence in the signature scheme and confidence that wallets can manage it without exposing users to state errors. The first calls for cryptographic scrutiny; the second calls for careful engineering and review of real implementations. No consensus yet. The proposal remains under development, and the review process will help show whether its security benefits justify the operational and network costs.
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